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RESUMO: Este estudo é uma pesquisa culturo-semântica sobre a
chamada baianidade em uma série de aspectos: o sentido tradicional
do termo; a cordialidade; a democracia racial; a miscigenação. Sugere-
se que, através do circulação do termo como prática e portanto como
realidade, se concede certo espaço e prestígio simbólico à negritude a
um nível estético-espiritual nacional em troca de certa passividade
política port parte da comunidade negra. Propõe-se, porém, que tal efeito
não deve ser classificado como uma manobra consciente do poder;
responde, antes, a um imperativo da economia interna do tráfico do
“capital simbólico”. Para exemplificar a fluidez e também o essencialismo
semânticos do termo, enfoca-se a palavra baiana que pela etimologia
significa uma região, mas que por metonímia cultural passa também a
conotar certa religião à exclusão de outras, e certa culinária à exclusão
de outras, e que, portanto, ilustra a hegemonia simbólica de um eixo
identitário entre diversos possíveis para o termo. Em contra-partida, o
artigo explora a adaptação da baianidade à (pós-)modernidade, como
sociedade de consumo, de individualismo e tolerância. Finalmente, o
artigo também compara a baianidade com outros discursos ideo-
estéticos da diáspora negra e as lógicas culturais poéticas
correspondentes.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: baianidade; baiana; miscigenação; democracia
racial; estética étnica
ABSTRACT: This article examines the notion of baianidade, the cultural
cosmovision traditionally associated with the state of Bahia and more
specifically with the region of the Baía de Todos os Santos. A series of
connotations for the term are examined, including cordiality, racial
democracy and miscegenation. Through the cultural practice of
baianidade, a social compromise is effected whereby material space and
symbolic prestige are conceded to the black community in exchange for
a relative political passivity. This exchange is not construed here as a
conscious manoeuvre by the established powers, but rather in terms of
the internal logic of an economy of symbolic capital. To exemplify both
the fluidity and the semantic essentialism characteristic of baianidade,
the article proceeds to the cultural semantics of the related term, baiana,
a nominalized adjective which etymologically denotes a female native of
the region, but by extension also denotes one among the various local
religions and an associated culinary tradition.  Against this essentializing
consolidation, the article then considers contemporary uses of the term
within a more individualistic consumer society. Finally, baianidade is
compared synchronically to other major ideo-esthetic discourses of the
Black diaspora.
KEYWORDS: baianidade; baiana; miscegenation; racial democracy;
ethnic aesthetics
Introduction: Bahian carnaval
The carnaval of Salvador, capital of Bahia state in Brazil, has
grown immensely in popularity in recent years, so that it now rivals the
more famous Rio carnaval in terms of numbers of visitors.  Carnaval
culture - music, dance, consumption and consequent entrepreneurial
opportunities - has spread to the whole calendar of annual and weekly
festivities, religious and secular, and has transformed Bahian society
both in terms of its internal recreation patterns and in terms of its
relations with external society.  While the prominent traditional
agricultural industries (cocoa, cattle, vegetables) have encountered
difficulties and contracted, tourism, largely based around carnaval or
carnavalesque attractions, has increased spectacularly and become the
center of growth strategies.   The old center of Salvador has been
transformed from extreme poverty and physical decay into the central
tourist destination.  Bahian pop music has penetrated the national
and international markets.  Bahian practices such as capoeira (martial
arts dance) have spread around the world.  An ever-growing number of
international visitors (about 400,000 a year in a city of 2.5 million)
arrive by plane, in search of cultural vitality and authenticity.  The
sheer volume of international visitors and the prominence of tourism
as a source of new employment has also transformed local experience
through personal exposure to foreigners with different ideas.  A
significant number of persons from previously completely marginalized
classes have visited or lived in Western European countries as a result
of this contact.  While world globalization (access and interaction between
different locations) has been the pre-condition of the cultural marketing
of Salvador to the world, the city itself has undergone globalization in
terms of qualitative culture as well as economic modernization.15 The
rise of Bahian carnaval beyond its former provincial status has been
predicated on an afrocentric aesthetic transformation of carnaval
performance.  From the late 1970s, afrocentric groups known as blocos
afro, with Yoruba names derived from the Afro-Bahian religion of
candomblé such as Ilê Ayê (“our house in this world”) and Olodum (“God
of Gods”), have become the conspicuous mark of the carnaval,
particularly from the external perspective.  The blocos afro donned
costumes derived from African patterns and cloths, and initially used
only percussion instruments.  The local population responded warmly
to the expression, and many bloco afro songs became local hits.  These
groups articulated an afrocentric ideological agenda notable in Brazilian
terms for its dissent from the conventional rhetoric of Brazilian
civilization, which denies racism and discourages ethnic nationalism.
Certain of the blocos afro have also developed active programs of social
intervention including the establishment of schools for local poor black
or mulatto (negro-mestiço) youth, where black identity (negritude) is
privileged with a valorization reversing the stigma of racism.  The
dissident rhetoric and the social work of the blocos afro have enhanced
the tourists’ sense of cultural alterity and authenticity.16
However, the transformation of carnaval has not been
restricted to the emergence of blocos afro.  In quantitative terms, the
carnaval is still dominated by conventional blocos, oriented to strictly
recreational entertainment without ideological overtones. Membership
in these blocos generally reflects the socio-economic segmentation
obtaining throughout the year, contradicting the notion of carnaval as
inversion of social hierarchies.  These blocos parade with huge trucks
covered in speakers, with a band on top (trio elétrico).  The trio bands
are hired professionals and play whatever style of music is popular at a
given moment.  When the local population showed a preference for
bloco afro songs, the trios adapted, appropriating the songs to their
own harmonic orchestration and making necessary aesthetic
adjustments such as a relative increase in the prominence of percussion.
The trios recorded bloco afro songs which became radio hits around the
country, and began the process of expansion of Bahian carnaval music.
The musical product, called axé music, is now integrated to the (year-
round) national pop music industry.  Reflective of the intersection of
globalization and local black subaltern energy, the term axé music
marries candomblé authenticity (axé - Yoruba for beneficial sacred spirit
of place or person) and international chic (the English “music” denotes
no more than its Portuguese equivalent, música; however the use of
English in Brazil enhances the cutting-edge flavour of concepts).17
The mercenary commercial appropriation of the bloco afro
material lends itself to analysis in terms of socio-ethnic exploitation.
However, the development of the Bahian carnaval industry can also be
seen in terms of a local, organic cultural logic.  First, the mainstream,
represented by the trios, has been musically Africanized (or, more
exactly, Afro-Brazilianized).  Second, the blocos afro themselves have
tended not to protest this appropriation but rather to themselves adapt
by moving toward the harmonic electrified orchestration which facilitates
commercial distribution.  The blocos afro have moved toward the societal
mainstream in aesthetic terms, and, reflecting their emerging
dependence on government and corporate patronage in a process of
capitalization and commercial distribution of their cultural product,
have been integrated to varying degrees into the city’s political
establishment.  This dual process of adaptation suggests the classic
pattern of fertile and opportunistic cultural miscegenation in Brazil and
Bahia in particular, which is a part of the cultural code known as
Bahianness, or baianidade.
Very few local scholars and organic intellectuals have ventured
critical analyses of the eventual theoretical contradictions between
afrocentric subaltern communitarian discourses and such concrete
compromises with the status quo.18  The reticence of scholars
(particularly non-Brazilians) reflects extreme discomfort with the idea
of hostility (even discursive) directed toward the representatives of
subaltern communities traditionally victimized by a society of which
the scholars are usually drawn from the elite.  The disinclination of
organic intellectuals (current and former bloco leaders, artists,
journalists, politicians, Afro-Brazilian religious leaders, communitarian
activists and project coordinators etc.) is consistent with an inherent
indisposition in Brazilian culture to sectarianism and to the social
isolation consequent to consistent application of critical criteria.
Brazilian civilization is based on webs of patronage and interdependence
which render intellectual separatism problematic at a pragmatic level.19
How is this to be interpreted by the external critic?  Though
the present study does attempt to assess the political efficacy of
ideological cultural agendas, the adopted approach is not scientific
isolation and measurement of a given object, concept or process.  The
article scrutinizes cultural and ideological arguments via a gradual
hermeneutic exegesis of the productive matrices of Bahian society, often
encapsulated in the term baianidade, here considered paradigmatic
for Brazilian civilization.  The intellectual frames of the non-Brazilian
academic - rationalist and, typically, liberal progressive - broadly parallel
those of local academics, and it is presumably inconceivable to abandon
such constitutional biases.  The interest here, however, is more in the
perspective of the organic intellectual, the constructor of carnaval and
bloco afro as a concrete praxis.  The study examines the pragmatic
dilemmas and rhetorical contradictions of an ideological carnaval agenda
caught in the balance between the constructive paradigms of Brazilian
civilization and the inspiration of external afrocentric discourses.  The
subject of study is not the bloco afro per se (examined elsewhere by the
author and others),20 but the mainstream cultural system (baianidade)
in which the blocos afro exist.  The ideological project of the blocos afro
is characterized here as an attempt to renew the ongoing process of
cultural miscegenation in a manner favorable to the interests of their
ethnic constituency by the introduction of external afrocentric themes
which balance the traditionally preponderant eurocentric values.
Previous and posterior to these discourses, the blocos afro are born
into a Bahian universe, struggle against it and may die within it.
Local and global terms of change
The cultural rubric of baianidade comprehends a series of
formal and informal religious, aesthetic and social praxes as well as
inferring particular community bonds (governing the terms of group
adscription, orienting political affiliation, etc.).  It is often difficult to
draw a clear line between art and politics in this productive frame, not
because Bahian art has been political but on the contrary because the
general socially conciliatory tendency in baianidade diminishes overt
class and ethnic conflict.  Baianidade has tended to be apolitical, and
to fuse aesthetic and moral issues by the subjection of the latter to the
former.  Its influence has been to diffuse social resentment and its logic
to encourage the hope of improvement of an individual’s credibility either
through material gain or aesthetic prestige.
The ideological project of Olodum, currently the most
important bloco afro, could be characterized as a call for a new generation
of baianidade, which politicizes the mainstream social mentality while
retaining the aesthetic energies characteristic of Bahian popular culture.
Activist black cultural expression in Bahia draws its inspiration from
external afrocentric models and its authenticity from the local tradition
(including Portuguese as language), which infers aesthetic praxes as
much as community bonds.  The new generation propose a radicalization
of the heritage, a sort of baianidade conscientizada (made socio-politically
aware) in which globalization would be locally translated into awareness
of international black identity and solidarity.  In this sense, globalization
is an informatizing tool to be used by an autonomous local subject
community.
But globalization - as Westernization - also impacts Bahian
society generally and, with the rise of the consumer generation, in ways
which problematize community allegiance and instead encourage
individualist strategies.  In this sense globalization actually presents a
continuity with certain aspects of baianidade, not so much in terms of
ideology as rather at the level of a pragmatic conceptual strategy which
tends to work to resolve material questions and issues of identity in
terms of the aesthetic domain rather than the moral; this process is
here called an “aesthetic escape hatch”, drawing on the term “mulatto
escape hatch” coined by political sociologist Carl Degler to describe
Brazilian race relations.
The factors militating for resistance the tendencies to
commodity over community and to aesthetification over moral and civil
consciousness raising (conscientização) are limited in number but
fundamental.  Firstly, the Afro-Brazilian legacy is ongoing, dynamic
and capable of incorporating Euro-Brazilians, so that rather than being
objectified as a commodity, Afro-Brazilian culture can increase its
presence in mainstream practice, i.e. enhance its profile as normative
rather than being restricted to an occasional aesthetic legitimacy
(temporally, during carnaval; spatially, within certain locales).  Secondly,
the whole logic of the aesthetic explosion of the re-Africanized Bahian
carnaval has been a return to African roots.  The Afro-centrification of
carnaval occurred prior to commercialization, an incidental
consequence.  The blocos afro continue to see themselves unequivocally
as representing a subaltern ethnicity whose concentrated aesthetic
energies result largely from social marginalization.  The bloco afro
Olodum proposes a sort of globalization which exploits Westernization
strategically, for material benefit, while at the moral level developing a
global conscientização in terms of the African diaspora.21
While analytic thought usefully divides the material, the
aesthetic and the moral, all affirmations of cultural identity tend to
fuse the categories just as they are organically integrated in the
individual.  The notion of interchangeable deposits of aesthetic, moral
and material “symbolic capital” has emerged as a prominent theme in
characterizations of the postmodern and late capitalism.  In a different
way - local, historical and culturally particular - semantic fluidity
between the aesthetic and the moral domains is a key facet in the
generative matrix of Bahian culture.  The phenomenon is explored in
this article and proposed as a factor revealing the implicit terms of
ethno-political compromise in Bahian society. Though the relation
between the material, the aesthetic and the moral is examined in
philosophical social theory and has been applied at an abstract analytic
level to the cultural paradigm of the African diaspora, the imperative
here is empirical rather than theoretical.22
The cultural matrices of baianidade
Baianidade is conceived as the typical sociability (cordiality,
tolerance, indulgence, laziness, optimism, humour) and characteristic
cultural praxes (candomblé, capoeira, extroverted street dancing,
fashion, etc.) of Bahian society.  It pertains essentially to the fertile
plantation region around the city of Salvador (until recently often simply
called Bahia) and All Saints Bay (Baía de Todos os Santos) called the
Recôncavo (literally, the “cove”, though it is about the size of the San
Francisco Bay).  Salvador is also the capital of the large state of Bahia
of which the greater part is the dry interior (sertão), which in cultural
terms belongs more properly to the vast sertão which comprises most
of the Northeast of Brazil, and which is dominated by different economic
and social regimes and a racial make-up with relatively less African
and more Amerindian elements.  Salvador is now the only city in Brazil
which is predominantly black (around 80%).  The city was capital of
Brazil for 250 years and as such the seat of civil and ecclesiastic
government.  Within the colonial world Salvador was a site of luxury,
indulgence and aesthetic sophistication, building handsome baroque
churches,  producing noted poets and orators, welcoming famous visitors
from Europe, and housing the idle sons of wealthy land-owners.  From
early times, a relatively higher proportion of slaves were domestics and
thus attuned to practices only possible in urban settings, including the
establishment of centres of Afro-Brazilian worship (terreiros of
candomblé) enjoying the patronage of wealthy free persons of all colours.
Finally, Salvador was the major Brazilian port receiving goods and
persons from Africa and sending goods to Africa, such as tobacco and
cowry shells; Salvador was integrated in the trade triangle between
Portugal, Africa and Brazil.  Despite British initiatives to outlaw slave
ships, the Atlantic trade continued and expanded through the first half
of the nineteenth century prior to its effective prohibition.  There was
also considerable movement of free individuals between Africa and
Salvador (Verger 1964).
Possibly due to the circumstance that the last great wave of
importation of slaves (1820s - 1840s) drew particularly on the coast of
present day Nigeria and Benin where the dominant ethnic group are
the Yoruba, this culture dominated the emergent Afro-Bahian religions
collectively called candomblé.   Candomblé preserves a pantheon of
mostly Yoruba deities, but has also integrated Amerindian spirit entities
and practices.  The interrelation between the African and the Christian
in candomblé, known as syncretism, is more complex and controversial.
For some, syncretism means a genuine fusion of elements from
heterogeneous belief systems which prove compatible for genuine
synthesis.  Persons of this persuasion stress the pagan elements
common in Brazilian “Folk” Catholicism, which is marked by rich pre-
Counter Reformation superstitions and beliefs, including the possibility
of active intervention in the world by various saints, particularly if
persuaded by acts of devotion - an agency parallel to that of the deities
(orixás) of candomblé;  the orixás are often called santos, and the
candomblé priest/priestess is the father/mother of the saints (pai/mãe-
de-santo).  For others it consists merely of a series of parallels between
the codes, which remain separate despite the association.  Proponents
of the latter perspective, often afrocentric purists, stress the superficiality
of the link at a spiritual level, pointing rather to its usefulness as
subterfuge - dissimulating from oppressive authorities a set of prohibited
but faithfully preserved beliefs.23  Finally, beyond synthesis and/or
association, syncretist society in Brazil has also meant simultaneous
adscription to more than faith.  For strictly religious studies, this is
less important than accuracy regarding the real theology of each faith;
however, from a cultural point of view, non mono-adscription has
profound implications in terms of conceptual tendencies and ethical
and political judgment (see below).
The broader societal paradigm of syncretism is the fusion of
different ethnic cultures and creative reinvention (cultural
miscegenation).  Brazil’s exceptional richness of racial and cultural
miscegenation is widely recognized.  Bahia, and baianidade, are the
“degree zero” of this miscegenation, despite the predominance of Rio de
Janeiro in its industrialized production and export, notably in Rio’s
carnaval (Armstrong 1999c).   Rio is said to be Brazil’s heart, São Paulo
its brain and Salvador its soul.  The inclusion of Salvador in this
representative triumvirate is significant since the first two cities are
megalopolises, while Salvador is today merely one of a number of second-
string metropolises.  Despite its long economic decline and reputation
as the national capital of filth, poverty and ignorance (in São Paulo and
Rio the term baianada means a barbarism or act of ignorant
incompetence), Bahia anchors national cultural identity.  This identity
is rooted in the demographic distributions of the past, in which blacks
and mulattos constituted the majority of the population.  Interestingly,
even in the twentieth century a significant portion of Brazilian
intellectual cultural production has come from Bahians.  The influence
at the popular level is much greater.  The recent rise in fortunes of the
Bahian carnaval and the penetration of the national (and international)
markets are not anomalous but rather reflective of a curious generative
power in Bahian culture despite economic insignificance (loosely
paralleled by the prominence of black culture in the U.S.).
Syncretism and its ultimate semantic ambivalence - as to
meaning, ideological adscription, interaction between ethnicities and
perhaps above all the simultaneous recognition of and periodic
engagement with different systems - capture well the mechanisms of
Bahian (and Brazilian) society and the psychological dispositions of
baianidade.  Different mechanisms and institutions of Brazilian society
are structurally informed by distinct cultural elements from the colonial
past. Brazilian government organs preserve the authoritarian and
conservative structures of the Catholic heritage, which can then be
analyzed in terms of the different regimes of various prominent orders,
including Dominicans (administrators of the Inquisition), Jesuits
(administrators of the Indian missions) and Franciscans.  The greatest
current obstacle to democratization is the entrenched system of
corruption involving the concession of advantages to friends and the
negotiation of favors between individuals on the basis of differences of
societal power (clientelismo), which has its roots in feudal Iberia.  This
political sub-culture resonates culturally with the system of personalized
authority and the procurement of intervention by more powerful
elements common to “Folk” Catholicism and candomblé.24  Attitudes to
syncretism and candomblé by local authorities have varied from the
ongoing phenomenon of patronage (publicly unacknowledged) to
outright legal prohibition.  The oscillation of tolerance between
identification, indulgence and periodic inefficient oppression is
characteristic of Bahian civil society.  However, despite leaders’
inclination to conservative patriarchal rhetoric, at the level of informal
cultural conception (how Bahians describe Bahia outside of official
transactions) Bahia’s reputation is as a place of extreme tolerance (and
even impunity), sensual indulgence, miscegenist and tropical seduction.
Syncretism also involves the simultaneous adscription to
different codes; in the classic religious instance Catholicism and
candomblé.  Psychologically speaking this infers a compartmentalization
of the individual’s rapports with different codes which are successively
invoked according to circumstance. Taking the religious case as an
instance, an example would be recourse to the Church to express
repentance and beg forgiveness, and recourse to candomblé to facilitate
execution of particular concrete tasks.  In socio-racial perceptions of
women, a Brazilian adage expresses succinctly pertaining
preconceptions: branca para casar, mulata para cama e negra para
cozinha (a white woman for marriage, a mulatto woman as mistress
and a black women in the kitchen).  The associations are thus white
respectability, black servitude and the intermediary mulatto as sensual
fantasy.  Apart from the arbitrariness of these stigmas, the point is also
that the (white male) Brazilian conception envisages the simultaneous
maintenance of the three separate rapports.  Marginalized genders,
races and classes in Brazil may be less empowered to achieve such
simultaneous multifaceted exploitation, but as members of the same
organic culture are also susceptible to the same conceptual procedure.
Thus a black male may pursue mulatto women with the aid of a black
mãe-de-santo but prefer a white male lawyer; in a more contemporary
context a mulatto women may cultivate negritude in personal cosmetics
but tend to underestimate the competence of black politicians.  In
Salvador the combination of cultivation of black looks associated with
afro-centrism (notably dreadlocks) has in the last decade become
common in certain working-class professions, however there seems to
be no correlative development of voting along colour lines let alone the
emergence of political clusters based around a consistent ethnic
ideology.25
The lack of patterns of a politicized black ethnicity in Bahia
can be explained in various ways.  A crucial characteristic of baianidade
is its rejection of or disengagement from social resentment, i.e. the
individual’s ideological adscription, with emotional affect, to perceived
systematic or occasional violations of principles and mechanisms of
social justice.  To consider this at the formal political level, Bahia and
Brazil present, historically speaking, low indices of both social revolt
and group solidarity despite material conditions propitious to collective
resentment (poverty and extreme income distribution inequity).  The
Brazilian political party system is built around clusters of personal
alliances with little consistent ideological markings along the
conventional spectrum from Left to Right.  In Brazil political judgments
tend to be subjective and changeable, and not based on the consistent
application of abstract principles (whether Left/Right orthodoxy or other
criteria).26  At the personal level, the absence of conventional
mechanisms of resentment and retribution pertain in contexts which
would be highly problematic for Western observers.  Rape victims
frequently do not report the crime, not so much because of a sense of
personal shame but rather because, from the civic perspective, the
expectation that the violator will be caught is low.  There is thus a
lacuna between personal experience and legal theory and/or cynicism
as to the possibility of justice; the subaltern individual is thus
psychologically disengaged from the assumptions about civil rights and
public space which are necessary for healthy civic intercourse. This
gap in political and ethical consciousness is aptly suggested by the
term cidadania (citizenship) used in the ongoing civic education
campaign: if in the West, citizenship is simply a right conferred or not
to an individual, in Bahia (and Latin American generally) cidadania
cannot be executed by legislation because it contradicts ingrained
cultural precepts and habits.  But the lack of (mechanisms of expression
of) resentment also plays out in the private moral sphere.  From a
personal psychological point of view,  the violation of rape may not be
conceived as recoupable by punishment of the perpetrator (i.e., legal
retribution would not, even at a symbolic moral level, “undo” or “make
up for” the violation).
This aspect of baianidade as non-receptive to the notion of
resent has frustrated the orthodox Left which has generally had little
success in fostering socialist consciousness of collective identity and
inter-class difference of interests.  Vertical axes of personal alliances
(and admiration of socially superior elements even if unallied) prevail
over horizontal class ties.  The absence of conventional resentment
patterns also contradicts the socio-ethical logic and dictums of the
cultural discourse which in the West has come to substitute socialist
solidarity as the dominant model of moral righteousness in the
secularized public sphere - the “politically correct” discourses which
defend a phalanx of heterogeneous cultural streams (based on gender,
race, class, ecological soundness, religious features, etc.) clustered under
the sign of subalterity and sharing the one characteristic of not belonging
to and being denied power by the central authorities (white, male,
bourgeois) who detain it.
Another factor in baianidade working against resentment is
its Utopian impulse.  Bahia, informally referred to as the “good earth”
(boa terra) figures poetically as a paradise on earth.  The history of
Brazilian rhetoric includes a whole tradition of extravagant eulogy of
the nation (ufanismo).  Carnaval music continues in the same vein,
both in the mainstream material (themes of bounteous fun, sun, dance,
happiness, love, etc.) and in bloco afro self-referential celebrations (either
of the bloco or the lyric protagonist of the song as heroic, super-endowed
and spiritually fulfilled).27  Baianidade’s compulsive beatific satisfaction
with all things Bahian tends to erode the possibility of critical discourse
and critical habits of thinking.  A classic example of this is the use of
musical entertainment in political rallies: aesthetic satisfaction is
substituted for social commentary.  Speeches without music are rare,
and normally the speeches are much shorter than the music.  The
candidate’s largesse and the public’s satisfaction with the musical
entertainment are the vital indices determining the seduction or not of
the voter.  The music played is axé music, of which the lyrical themes
inevitably gravitate to the euphorias of love, festivity and simply being
in Bahia.
In the intellectual domain, an interesting manifestation of
baianidade’s baroque maintenance of a multiplicity of themes is the
simultaneous subscription to apparently contradictory assertions about
the cultural legacy.  Baianidade celebrates both the creativity of
miscegenation and the purity of the African legacy (nagôcentrismo) as
fundamental characteristics of society, though the two phenomena
evidently infer differing views of organic development.  This simultaneous
subscription is not processed critically but rather accepted because of
its ideological desirability. Both processes are viewed as positive, and
so both are incorporated into the conceptual economy.  This tolerance
of eventual logical contradictions is consistent with syncretism as a
cultural paradigm.
One of the seminal artistic articulators of baianidade is the
composer Dorival Caymmi (active from the 1930s to the 1960s and still
alive), who wrote for Carmen Miranda and others.  Caymmi’s repertoire
of lyrical subjects - fishermen, baianas (women who cook and sell Afro-
Bahian food in the street; candomblé acolytes, they wear an elaborate
costume of white lace petticoats, as well as beads),28 lovers, vagrants,
family members as well as the natural elements (notably the sea) and
cultural artifacts (food, etc.) presents the whole spectrum of Bahian life
in terms of a folkloric tableau which is also a profound socio-
psychological cultural portrait.  In a study astutely titled Caymmi:  A
Utopia of a Place, the Bahian cultural critic Antonio Risério (1993) notes
how Caymmi deliberately restricted his repertoire to this set of Bahian
prototypes, completely disregarding the major social changes taking
place during the period due to the petro-chemical industrialization of
the Recôncavo.  Caymmi depicted the traditional fishermen and not the
more numerous port workers.  Caymmi’s work displays an indifference
to both the socio-economic terms of modernization and, despite his
championing of subaltern figures such as the poor fisherman, to
conventional progressive discourses denouncing racial oppression.  In
his composition “São Salvador”, Caymmi explicitly articulates the themes
of felicitous miscegenation and equity of opportunity:  Bahia is the land
of the white who is effectively mulatto by acculturation, and the black
university graduate (“a terra do branco mulato e do preto doutor”).
The work of Brazil’s most famous novelist, Jorge Amado, is
particularly interesting in this light.  Amado was an active Communist
Party member and attempted in most of his early novels to follow Marxist
socialist realism guidelines.  An early novel, Jubiabá, actually juxtaposes
a rebellious young protagonist who at the book’s end discovers the
greater cause of the anti-capitalist strike, and an old candomblé
practitioner, widely respected by the community but ultimately co-opted
by the establishment because he is unable to grasp the meaning of the
strike.  Despite his minimal role in the action, the pai-de-santo gives
the book its title, marking the weight of the issue in Amado’s mind.
Amado’s subsequent development involved a return to his cultural roots
and, simultaneously, production of his greatest work and the accusation
of dealing in provincial stereotypes.  The controversy around Amado’s
work continues to the present; he is unique amongst leading Brazilian
writers in having been the object of scathing hostility (on aesthetic and
intellectual grounds) by a significant number of nationally dominant
literary critics. The accusation of a beatific but opportunistic dealing in
stereotypes could also be leveled against the most famous visual renderer
of Bahia, the painter Carybé.  Great Bahian art seems to be anchored
in an aesthetic pantheon of a limited set of socio-ethnic stereotypical
figures, of which the sovereign is the beautiful, sensual mulatto woman.
The potential criticisms of this expression from a conventional
progressive perspective need not be enumerated.  While it is consistently
profoundly politically incorrect in gender terms it is racially and socially
progressive in its celebration of miscegenation and the masses (povo),
and in that it is genuinely popular with the povo (in Amado’s case
contradicting the almost universal law that poor Brazilians do not read
novels).
This authenticity is enigmatic in that it again contradicts
contemporary theory in the logic of subject positions (subalterns can
not be accurately represented by non-subalterns).  The great Bahian
artists (Caymmi, Amado, Carybé, Caetano Veloso, Gilberto Gil) are male
and disproportionately white (though Caymmi is pardo, and Gil black)
and bourgeois.  Further, the great intellectual and artistic subscribers
to baianidade include foreigners who are “Bahian by choice” (baiano
por opção).  Carybé is Argentinean.  The greatest artistic presence in
the historically important Recôncavo town of Cachoeira was a German
lithographer who settled there and changed his name to Hansen Bahia.
The most important non academic scholar of candomblé in Bahia since
World War II was the French photographer turned pai-de-santo, Pierre
Verger.  Baianidade is thus a discourse of miscegenation which
celebrates negritude and admits persons regardless of race and even
nationality as community members and representatives.
Brazilian race constructs
The general background of race relations and race discourse
in Brazil present a series of aspects which problematize conventional
objective assessment: i) the objective reality of quantitatively verifiable
indices of racial inequity, division and even de-facto segregation;  ii) the
celebration of miscegenation as a national cultural trope and the
centrality of Afro-Brazilian motifs in the repertoire of nationally defining
aesthetic symbols;  iii) the popular acceptance of government rhetoric
denying racial inequity (the myth of “racial democracy”, democracia
racial) and, crucially, discouraging as unpatriotic the establishment of
formal organizations based on exclusivist racial identities.  Bahia and
Rio have been the fundamental loci of socio-cultural perspectives
affording scholarly credibility to the notion that Brazil really is different
(from the U.S.).
Investigation of Brazilian race relations sustained two major
discourses which partially overlapped chronologically.  One line, that
of racial democracy, followed up on Gilberto Freyre’s seminal socio-
anthropological explications of harmonious cultural miscegenation,
emphasizing class as a structural impediment to the social ascension
of non-whites.  The argument of this line is that, pragmatically, “the
rich black is white;  the poor white is black”,  inferring the possibility of
individual ascension on the condition of economic capital.   The notion
of differential social possibilities of two racially similar individuals is
fundamental.  First, it denies that Brazilian racism is racist (biologically
based). Second, in its stress on variation it implies a crucial structural
circumstance: individual subjectivity.  Social ascension infers an implicit
change of racial status toward whiteness;  this in turn means that an
individual can psychologically project him/herself into a different socio-
racial position.   Evidently, it is easier for a lighter skinned person of
color to perform this operation, whereas it would take more money for
a black person to ascend socially and “become white”. In the Brazilian
racio-social system lightness of skin and money are alternate forms of
symbolic capital legitimizing an individual’s claim to the status of
whiteness.   These processes of class over race, the subjective agency of
the individual are captured in the term “mulatto escape hatch” coined
by the American Carl Degler (see Degler 1986).   Several classical studies
in this line are based on Bahian society just prior to the end of the
period through which, due to economic stagnation, socio-cultural
conditions were relatively stable, before the modest industrialization
from the late 1950s and the current rapid population expansion and
rise of tourism.29
The other line basically represents the acknowledgment,
assimilation and application of North American quantitative sociology.
Adopting a materialist line, the “São Paulo school” (Florestan Fernandes,
Octávio Ianni and others), through the adoption of quantitative data,
verified the existence of structures of racial inequity and therefore
“racism”.30  Rationalists’ objections to the apologias of Brazilian race
relations as a soft, class-based race code (rather than “real” racism,
i.e., biologically-based) have also been verified and quantitatively
substantiated in studies conducted in Bahia.31  Notwithstanding the
opportunities for the individual to negotiate the system’s ambiguity and
subjectively determine his/her ethnic affiliation (the “mulatto escape
hatch”), the extent to which an individual is subjected to racism by
others purely on the basis of assumptions about the appropriate status
and cultural meaning of his/her genetic make-up, as well as the extent
to which class differentiation parallels racial differentiation may be quite
independent of this, and thus tend to broadly replicate North American
quantitative data.
Afro-Bahian culture (often re-articulated in Rio and then
exported) has tended to obfuscate other traditions in representations
of Brazilian identity.32   Alternate ethno-cultural profiles include other
Afro-Brazilian traditions (for example, in the religious domain the Xangô
cults in Pernambuco, Tambor de Mina in São Luis), the Euro-Brazilian
mainstream, and Amerindian ethnicities outside of the Amazon.  There
is very little scholarly acknowledgment of the diachronic dislocation
between the rhetorical equity of the foundational Brazilian racial triangle
(whereby Europeans, Africans and indigenes are all contributors to
national culture) and the color binarism of the modern urban coastal
cultural scenario.
The common lexicon registers various phenotypes indicating
specifically Amerindian (índio) genealogy33.  Brazilian Portuguese has
specific terms for each basic type of mestiço (Black/Amerindian: cafuzo;
Black/White: mulato;  White/Amerindian: caboclo);  there are many
more very specific terms for miscegenist permutations.34   However,
while common Brazilian language, unlike North American, has thus
historically distinguished a series of intermediary racial types between
Negroid, Caucasian and Mongoloid, these are tending more and more
to function, as it were, as shades of gray, i.e., as combinations of two
opposed designators (black and white) rather than in terms of the
multiple combinations of three prime colors.  Modern quantifiers, notably
the census, use the terms branco (white), negro,  pardo or mulatto and
amarelo (yellow, i.e. descended from Asian immigrants and not
Amerindian).   Pardo and mulato (brown and mulatto) have become
essentially synonymous, though pardo is vaguer in the connotation of
African ascendance and infers a hew (intermediary brown color between
“black” and “white”, due to either African or Amerindian blood) rather
than a specific racial origin.  The amarelo element (2%) is inconsequential
demographically and marginalized in national cultural representation.
The census categories reflect a practical cultural reality in urban coastal
concentrations of population:  Amerindians are subsumed into the pardo
class.  The term is historically conveniently ambiguous as to the specific
racial provenance of non-whiteness, thus justifying the grouping of
brown Amerindians and brown Afro-Brazilians.  In terms of connotation,
the term then drifts semantically if not to mulato genes then to Afro-
Brazilian cultural praxis, because this has been the dominant popular
culture of the urban masses.   Thus pardo and mulato are tending to
become synonymous.   With the greater utility of pardo as a census
term for non-whites, the retention of the term mulato may in future be
unnecessary; it really reflects past social conditions in which persons
of mixed African and Caucasian origin profited from a term making the
white element explicit, for the sake of social privilege.
In Brazil, the cultural expansion of black identity so as to
constitute the major recognizable cultural standard of the popular
classes is a corollary of the socio-racial principle of baianidade and
gives a kind of distorted logic to the racial democracy argument.  Rather
than vertical equity in the social hierarchy there is an inverse
compensation for the white cultural coloring of the elite.  Such
compensation for the bias at the top by the bias at the bottom is hardly
just.  However, in a sense it validates the precept in racial democracy
that what matters is not color but data external to genealogy.  Differences
between theories and differences between theory and reality often derive
from the ambivalence of the notion of ethnicity, which infers notions of
both race and culture.  In Brazil, it is not the case that class dictates
racial identity so much as that class dictates cultural identity, which is
in turn usually associated with a particular racial heritage; the denial
of racism hinges on this structural nuance, whereas for orthodox
quantitative sociology the social concomitance of the terms verifies the
presence of racism.  Class may thus be said to  determine “ethnicity” in
the sense of ethnicity as the common cultural praxis of a community
and not as a biological register.   A view of race relations in Brazil drawing
on both the quantitative data suggesting racism and the qualitative
essays affirming harmonious miscegenation may be captured in the
following précis: though it reveals classic patterns of racial segmentation
and discrimination, Brazil racism is democratic in its biases are shared
relatively consistently across ethnicities and classes, and in that its
subjective character facilitates a high degree of individual potential
mobility.    Brazilian race relations may also be considered democratic
in that different ethnicities are differentially assigned representative
status.  While the elite is psychologically colored in as white, the
normative ethnic representation of the masses is black, despite the
bio-demographic recession of this element of the population.  From
this perspective, the greatest victims of the schema are the numerous
people of color who are not predominantly Negroid, such as the caboclos
of the sertão, the mamelucos of the Amazon and so on.
This constitutes a phenomenon of socio-cultural
appropriation, albeit by a group designated as subaltern according to
the conventional indices of social power.  This de facto cultural
imperialism from the bottom is largely based on two modalities of
prestige, one aesthetic and the other derived from perceived authenticity.
The notion of traditional Afro-Brazilian culture as authentic is manifest
in the way the baiana’s colonial-era clothing and candomblé affiliation
bespeak the historical heritage in a way that, for example, converts to
Protestantism (crentes) do not, regardless of current numbers.
Aesthetics and authenticity are invoked in the obligatory practice of
placing baianas at the head of Rio’s escolas-de-samba.  This latter
phenomenon is contained within a quintessential national
identificational ritual in which the Rio locale bears the national mantle.
The symbolic etymology of the baiana reveals, however, the central role
of Bahian culture in the national mythological pedigree.35
There is clearly strong resistance to conventional North
American liberal notions of the normative indices of racism in the
productive logic of baianidade.  If one cannot discount the objective
data of the material rationalists, it is also true that analyses of baianidade
along the lines of the denunciations of the myth of racial democracy as
a government or elite conspiracy to dupe the masses do not adequately
explore the richness of articulations generated within the cultural system
of baianidade.  This richness is not merely a folkloric circumstance but
rather a substantial economic resource - incarnated in the baiana and
reflected in the weight of tourism in the Bahian economy, in the fact
that this tourism is substantially cultural rather than centered around
features of physical infrastructure (beaches etc.), and in the economic
and cultural impact of tourism on local conditions.  At another level, as
an active popular creative discourse, the circulation of the mythology
of baianidade influences perceptions and realities based on perception
(if one does not believe racism exists one is less likely to suffer from it,
at least subjectively and consciously), and is therefore an influential
element of sociological experience regardless of its inadequacy as an
encapsulation of material reality.   Finally, the rationalist model is
virtually useless in humanist explications of artistic output produced
within and characteristic of the discursive system of baianidade;  the
rationalist approach, at least as it has usually been applied,  tends to
be negatively reductive, arguing that great Bahian art such as that of
Jorge Amado and Dorival Caymmi reflects alienation of the people and/
or exploitation by the artist.  Conversely, the Utopian impulse in
baianidade to marginalize the moderate, critical spirit problematizes
its own testimonial value.
Baianidade thus reveals surprising strengths and weaknesses
as a socio-racial philosophy and as a generative cultural system; the
following section proposes that the deeper cultural logic of Brazilian
race relations is as a compensatory system of racial representation which
camouflages an equation of social power between racial segments. The
equation affords selective representation rather than equity; in the
distributive economy of symbolic capitals, aesthetic and moral indices
are scrambled in a way which facilitates the preservation of a pattern of
material inequity.  Blacks are prominent within a restricted set of icons
of Brazilian national identity and baianidade; the aesthetic prestige
afforded these figures compensates for the ongoing moral stigma
associated with the same Afro-Brazilian cultural fonts. The moral
prestige of Catholicism over candomblé, for example, translates into a
moral devaluation of black praxes (candomblé as macumba, black magic)
and ultimately legitimizes the continuing socio-economic marginalization
of blacks.  Nevertheless, the ceding of space in the aesthetic domain to
Afro-Brazilian representations creates a domain of symbolic
empowerment and entrepreneurial opportunity.  Pragmatically, this is
a more significant outlet for Afro-Brazilians than the path prescribed
in the apologias of Brazilian race relations. Quantitative indices of the
marginalization of blacks in Brazil show little improvement over time
because of the denial of racism, so that the notion of the mulatto escape
hatch in the socio-economic domain is, quantitatively speaking, a
chimera.  In the aesthetic domain, however, a reverse racism pertains.
Afro-Brazilians actually benefit from a symbolic capital greater than
that of whites.  Various praxes considered typical of Brazilian identity
are associated with blacks: the baiana, samba and other dances, Rio
carnaval, futebol (soccer), malandragem (persuasion, tricksterism), jogo
de cintura (literally, “the play of waist”; dexterous maneuvering,
disengagement from danger);  in short, a series of plastic and
psychological praxes and approaches, most of which are constitutive
element of baianidade.  As suggested on the one hand by the prominence
of visual icons and on the other by the inclusion of ethically dubious
elements such as malandragem, the semantic link between these
elements is aesthetic grace.  This selective representation opens a space
for blacks, but the open paths are restricted to the aesthetic domain.
Consistent with the cultural matrices of syncretism, as icons these
praxes infer a specific moral symbolic capital in addition to their aesthetic
symbolic denotations;  the moral charge is generally negative, the
aesthetic positive.  Thus the escape route for blacks is fueled by the
perception of aesthetic grace but dragged by the perception of moral
dubiousness:  it is a merely an “aesthetic escape hatch”.
Rather than as a simple populist illusion, the discourse of
baianidade works as a two-edged sword.  While eroding rightful
resentment against material inequity between racial groups and eroding
group solidarity, it also serves to validate Afro-Bahian (and therefore
Afro-Brazilian) ethnicity as nationally constitutive.  It is a guarantor of
representational existence.  However, this representation is in turn
conceptually filtered.  Religious and ethical components tend to be
reduced to or at least encapsulated within aesthetic corollaries which
are, as it were, semantically fickle as to their ultimate symbolic capital.
The aesthetic valorization of a community is always secondary to its
moral constitution.  Such valorization affords benefits and opportunities,
but to what extent it validates and guarantees the worth and the
legitimacy of the ideological underpinnings of the community is unclear
(indeed, from the conspiracy theory point of view,  the whole point is
that commodification of a ethno-cultural ecology putatively validates
an identity without in fact guaranteeing the objective enforcing of its
moral code).
In political terms, baianidade has tended to be more
compatible with individual subjectivity than with inter-group
differentiation and exclusion.  In the terms presented here, this also
plays out in an inclination for the aesthetic compromise solution,
amenable to all regardless of cult, over the rigidity of a moral code:
aesthetic solutions, of which carnaval is the most prominent, substitute
for genuine material changes.  But while infrastructural reforms affecting
Bahians’ every lives have been slow to materialize, baianidade itself
possesses a certain representational gravity affecting art, and thus the
terms of the social process and in turm material conditions.
Surprisingly, baianidade has proved to be partially a self-fulfilling
prophecy:  the mulatto escape hatch cannot be seen merely in terms of
letting the person of color cash in material assets for social credibility;
rather aesthetic assets warrant an ambivalent credibility, at one level
susceptible to merely ephemeral valorization (notably in carnaval), but
in another sense of the greatest potential value, because, as the arbiter
of authenticity, they dominate the terms of national identity.  Afro-
Brazilian cultural praxis is the master discourse of national spiritual
identity, and the pragmatic recreational vehicle of a good part of the
population, including many poor whites.
Globalization and negritude
This cultural affirmation of negritude is extremely ambiguous
in its fluid movement between class and ethnic connotations.  It is
characteristically subaltern and black; ultimately the question is
whether or not there is a necessary concomitance of these terms at the
pragmatic level of generative rhetoric.  The Brazilian cultural matrix
allows for the ethnic adscription to negritude of (poor) non-blacks and
is thus apparently a colonizing culture likely to survive and grow.  But
if this form of negritude is ultimately a discourse of subalterity rather
than Africanness, its ethnic authenticity is compromised and, more
importantly, its vitality is parasitically dependent on the marginalization
of non-whites.  In the latter sense the danger is that the celebration of
negritude, despite a rhetoric of valorization, will not lead to the
transformation to full membership rights in society (cidadania).  In light
of the civic ambiguity of aesthetic valorization of Afro-Brazilian
expression, the issue casts into doubt the relation between form
(aesthetic manifestation) and content (social agenda) in the
Africanization of the carnaval of Salvador.
The rhetoric of the blocos afro movement combines a series of
progressive agendas.  The emergence of the blocos was concomitant
with the re-establishment of democracy in Brazil after military
dictatorship (1964-1985), and reflects the “New Left” discourse of
grassroots empowerment, consciousness-raising (conscientização) and
cidadania.  At the same time and as a part of the process of globalization,
New Left elements in Europe including the Catholic Church,
governments, international aid banks and a host of “non-government
organizations” (in Brazil, ONGs) sponsored many communitarian
projects throughout Latin America.  An important element of the at-
the-grass-roots philosophy was presentation of the progressive agenda
in terms of local cultural authenticity, seen as the only guarantor of
the real assimilation of new values.  In Salvador the designated roots
culture has virtually exclusively been Afro-Brazilian.  Virtually all major
communitarian projects in Salvador receive aid in some form or other
from Europe (and other wealthy regions).  The best known community
project in Salvador in the 1980s and 1990s has been the Projeto Axé,
aimed at protecting and reforming street children.  The title draws on
the same candomblé word used in axé music;  the founder and leader
of the mission is an Italian priest.  At the informal level, tourists visiting
Salvador range from the conventional frequenters of historic sites and
beaches, to persons intent on sexual exploitation of local poor women
and prostitutes, to highly informed and interested individuals who stay
for long periods, take classes in local cultural activities and indirectly
contribute greatly to conscientização.  Thus, at a moral as well as an
economic level afrocentric projects in Salvador have been underwritten
by European support.
Given the rich Brazilian tradition denying racism and
discouraging afrocentric nationalism, Afro-Bahian organic intellectuals
drew inspiration almost completely from a series of external models.
Three general schools of afrocentric ideology were of particular
pertinence: i) anti-colonial Pan-Africanism;  ii) the African-
(North)American struggle for civil rights and subsequent aesthetic
revolution (“Black is beautiful”);  iii) Rastafarianism.
The emergence of Ilê (1976) directly followed the collapse of
the Portuguese colonial empire and the liberation of Angola, Mozambique
and Guinea Bissau.  Ilê’s carnaval depiction of African revolutionaries
carrying (fake) AK-47s and wearing African clothes was a seminal
moment of symbolic liberation and a shock to Salvador’s population
and to the Brazilian military government.  The liberation struggle
produced a series of heroes and critical writings offering inspiration.
The early years of both Ilê Ayê and Olodum focused (in the annual
carnaval themes) on Africa in the form of contemporary states and the
“Black Athena” theme of Negroid Egyptian pharaohs.36  This reflects
the prominence of pan-Africanism as the initial afrocentric rhetoric.
In subsequent years the afro-diaspora in the New World has
become more important, focusing on Caribbean states such as Cuba,
and African-American leaders such as Malcolm X.  The relative decline
of pan-Africanism is attributable to a series of factors.  The movement
lost momentum in Africa and across the globe once most states were
liberated (though attention subsequently passed to apartheid South
Africa).  More importantly, the New World models offer the real organic
parallel for Brazil, as states where the presence of blacks was due to
slavery, and the contemporary marginalization of blacks an organic
development from that condition.  Just as U.S. quantitative sociology
(verifying racism) eventually infiltrated leading sectors of Brazilian
academia despite its implications for state-sponsored national
mythologies, African-American hard-edged perceptions of and
approaches to dealing with racism were accessible and influential,
reflecting the emerging hegemony of the U.S. model in virtually cultural
trends.
Bloco afro leaders, like the rest of the population in Salvador,
have always been greatly influenced by prominent black artists.  African
American artists are admired, expressive trends are emulated, (at times
in terms of a purely aesthetic, recreational agenda rather than with
ideological inflections  - this seems to be the case with the ongoing
popularity of funk in Rio37).  This form of direct, organic ideological
passage is best exemplified in the case of Rastafarianism afro-centrism
as communicated through the reggae of Bob Marley and others.  While
Brazil has few genuine practitioners of the Rastafarian religion and few
books on the topic have been translated into Portuguese, the reverence
for Marley is immense.  His music is played constantly and it is not
uncommon for people to memorize lyrics even though they are in English.
There are a large number of men with dreadlocks called rastas in
Salvador and elsewhere who subscribe ideologically to reggae (regardless
of their actual intellectual digestion of Rastafarianism) and a significant
minority element of the youth who prefer to dance to reggae, implying
an ideological support.
The compatibility of bloco afro ideology and these external
models is problematic because of the organic peculiarities of each.  Pan-
Africanism has declined as a model both because of the fundamental
differences of African society from Brazil and because of the relative
dearth of continental African superstar artists.  But structural conflicts
can also be construed in terms of the character of baianidade as a
generative model.  Independently of government promotion of the racial
democracy discourse, baianidade proposes a model of racially
miscegenist integration around a rhetorical pole of negritude; this model
insists its openness to persons of all color.  In general, authentic Bahian
culture is based on practices which while associated with negritude
are considered Brazilian rather than African.  Capoeira, for example,
originally known as capoeira angola and believed to derived from Bantu
peoples in Angola, is being exported back to Africa, (where it was no
longer, if ever, practiced) but at a slower rate than its circulation in
Western countries and around Brazil.  An interesting example occurs
in the domain of the one great putatively purist axis of African legacy,
candomblé (of which Yoruba is the liturgical language).  Despite the
notion of faithful preservation, the orthodox rhetoric speaks of
syncretism and the ritual formally invokes Catholicism. In what could
be called high candomblé (in terreiros with the most material resources,
where rituals are observed with greater scruples of purity), one must
be baptized in the Catholic Church to be a member; the most
conspicuous public manifestations of candomblé are ritual lavagens
(washings) of the steps of churches, certain of which are considered
particularly holy sites for candomblé (notably the church of Nosso Senhor
do Bom Fim, Our Lord of Good Venture).  The recent rise within
candomblé of an element proposing purification, i.e., elimination of
syncretist “pollution” constitutes a genuinely continental afrocentric
perspective.  However outside of wealthy terreiros the dominant trend
is the rise of candomblé de caboclo (Amerindian), a school of candomblé
with greater integration of indigenous spirits and practices (including
consumption of tobacco and alcohol) previously disparaged as less
powerful in magic and socially marginal - partly because it did not enjoy
the patronage of the Euro-Bahian establishment.   This detail is
suggestive of the organic social links between races in the most powerful
terreiros, which may well militate against their “purification” despite
the fact it is elements within this privileged circle that have been most
receptive.  Ironically, it may well be the case that the only domain where
purism dominates is among university-trained religious anthropologists.
Thus, local conditions present a series of logistic obstacles to the
purification movement, and contrary trends are also emerging in less
privilege sectors which are more attuned to the logic of baianidade and
the habitual mentality of the general population.
The African American model of activism for civil rights based
on quantitative verification of socio-economic discrepancies between
racial groups and pursuit of parity by means of intervention including
“affirmative action” and quota obligations for employers encounters
serious logistic and conceptual obstacles in Brazil.  The democratization
process brought some concessions, such as the outlawing of racism.
However, the general immaturity of Brazilian civil democracy has meant
a huge gap between the declaration and the enforcement of civil laws
(the classic example being the concomitance of new laws acknowledging
children’s rights to protection, and the proliferation of “death squads”
eliminating homeless children).  Pertinent Brazilian civil institutions
(universities, governments, corporations) do not dispose at present of
the infrastructural resources for implementation of models such as
affirmative action.  Secondly, this would require formal acknowledgment
and quantitative substantiation of indices of racial disparity.  Brazil’s
census perennially presents a sharp underestimate of the proportion
of “blacks” and overestimate of “whites” through the agency of subjective
ethnic affiliation; a complete cultural transformation even at the initial
stage of identifying racial identity would be required.  Finally, a further
transformation would be necessary in terms of political affiliation, since
in Brazil there is neither a race-based nor a class-based voting block.
Thus, the lobbying process in favor of blacks as an interest group,
fundamental to the passage of legislation in the U.S., has no parallel in
Brazil.   As stated earlier, the general operative principle of Brazilian
politics of candidates earning votes through systems of personal alliance
(clientelismo) implies a logic of axes of allegiance which in relation to
social hierarchies are vertical rather than  horizontal and thus transcend
the existence of socio-economic segmentation according to race.  Though
not a peculiarity of baianidade, clientelismo is its characteristic political
model.  In terms of acculturated modes of perception of civil life, the
absence of resentment characteristic of Baianidade - or at least the
disinclination to actively seek retributive justice - problematizes the
possibility of social mobilization to demand reform of racially inequitous
conditions.  Though slowly improving levels of education and steadily
increasing professional expectations are facilitating a gradual integration
of the extensive North American sub-culture of litigation for personal
injury and damage (reflective of very sophisticated criteria of personal
responsibility, and, contrarily, against the notion of organic community,
of an ever heightening sense of distance between individuals), the
contemporary “carnavalization” of Bahian society (organization of social
life around carnaval or carnavalesque festivities, investment of more
personal resources in recreational pursuits, and a general philosophy
of hedonistic carpe diem) militates against the premise of sharp divisions
between each individual’s personal space and the ready defense against
incursions through formalized civil mechanisms including litigation and
recourse to tribunes of justice.
Caribbean black nationalist separatism in the form of a
secularized pop version of the precepts of Rastafarianism, proselytized
largely through reggae, presents the afrocentric discourse most
stridently contrary to the cultural logic of baianidade.  While the notion
of necessary return to Africa (in either the Garveyite sense pertaining
to West Africa, or to the Ethiopia of Haile Selassie) has faded into the
mythological background of Rastafarianism ideological religion, the faith
still comprehends a racio-historical essentialism determining differential
roles according to genetic make-up, and complete rejection of the (post-
)colonial Western aesthetic codes which largely determine mainstream
societal norms.38  The celebration of miscegenation in Baianidade, the
insistence on the right of access to Afro-Bahian cultural currents of
persons regardless of race, and the power of rhetoric suggesting felicitous
racial camaraderie constitute a cultural ideology of an opposing order
to that of Rastafarianism.  The protagonist of Baianidade is not so much
a people as a societal locus, a Utopian discourse which transcends the
genuine woes of historical experience.  The rhetoric of baianidade as to
slavery is restricted to anecdotes of personal sentiments such as cruelty,
sexual attraction, affection and so on, completely obfuscating essentialist
determinism and thus the notion of the historic role and destiny of
blacks.
Despite this inpropitious scenario, reggae has stimulated an
ongoing ideological resonance in Bahia.  Rastafarian style (notably for
hair) provides the normative look for the aspiring black artist; the sacred
colors of black, red, yellow and green orient the ornamental color schema
for Olodum (used in clothes, on drums, on CD covers and so on).  The
generic heroization of Bob Marley is not really specific as to ideological
content:  Marley is admired for his courage, loved for his musical talent,
wailed for his untimely death; he figures as a role model, as the perfect
integration of a series of superlative qualities for a black man.
The Rastafarian insistence on a black aesthetics also resonates
profoundly in Bahia as a rebuttal of previous eurocentric cosmetic
standards.  The relative valorization of a person on the basis of
appearance (in racism, racial essentialisms, everyday work-place biases,
gender interaction and so on) is suggestive of the liminality between
moral and aesthetic symbolic capitals.  Within Bahian culture, a system
heavily predicated on aesthetic capital (the indispensable importance
of beauty and style for personal advancement, particularly for blacks),
the new afrocentric aesthetic valorization articulates and as it were
promises a fulfillment of the individual which also impacts material
and moral standing.  While successive African American styles have
provided the bulk of innovations of look, Jamaican aesthetic dignity is
more morally sure-footed because it is based on a consistent and
profound afrocentric ideological system.  The impact of this cohesive
anti Euro-centric logic as a symbolic inspiration in Bahia must not be
underestimated.
At the same time, the ultimate ideological dissonance between
black ethnic nationalism and baianidade is fundamental.  According to
recent scholarship, Rastafarianism’s ideological rigor and purism is
organically linked to the Protestant fundamentalism which had
flourished in the Jamaican black underclass.39  Baianidade is based on
syncretism, itself based on the tolerance (in the culture) of Catholicism
for approximations of beliefs and the endless deferral of the abolition of
“superstitions”. Baianidade is eminently “humane” and non-judgmental
- it is eclectic, psychologically flexible, and tolerant of contradictions
and hypocrisy in ideologies, politics and personal identification.
Rastafarian doctrine is the most complete example of afro-
centrism specifically oriented to New World as opposed to contemporary
continental African experience.  New World afro-centrism is
characteristically predicated on black subalterity; it contests oppression
through a moral defense of blacks which is aesthetically substantiated
in a series of praxes (notably in music) and valorizations of looks
(rebutting the eurocentric stigmas of black looks as ugly because
different).  Rastafarianism presents the resolution of ethnic alienation
through a radical inversion of white/black totem/taboo.  The rhetorical
trope of such afro-centrism is a positive negative - marks of black
ethnicity which previously marked inferiority or ugliness are reinvented
as positive icons. For example, kinky hair - called “bad hair” in Jamaica
and in Brazil (cabelo ruim) - is adapted to the dreadlocks style, to which
it is better suited than straight hair, and made a sacrosanct item of
ritual paraphernalia.  In terms of historical experience, the slavery period
is recast to focus not only on victimization but also on successful
resistance (notably runaway slave enclaves, in Brazil known as
quilombos); the black person emerges as heroic survivor.
Black cultural expressions in the New World are intimately
associated with populism because artists generally derive from the
popular classes and create cultural product for popular audiences.  This
naturally leads to a semantic confusion of black ethnicity and class
subalterity:  black energy becomes a street energy, an energy of the
masses, capable of representing the masses despite significant racial
variation within the population.
The blocos afro of Salvador capitalize on this association to
varying degrees.  Ilê Ayê, representing as it were the aristocracy of blocos
afro, is more influential amongst older people, is oriented to black
aesthetic prestige, looks more to Africa, and is politically integrated to
the local conservative politicians.  Olodum is socially militant.  Its
aesthetic style (percussion, presentation) is cruder and more energetic,
reflecting a conscious appeal to adolescent energies and an outlet for
subaltern recreational dissidence.  Ilê Ayê implements the afrocentric
pole of baianidade: aesthetically refined negritude, a sense of the purity
of African heritage, and complete integration to the political status quo.
In the social critiques in its official literature Olodum imports
contestatorial discourses alien to baianidade; however scrutiny of its
song lyrics (the more substantial outlet for discourse) suggest an
increasing tendency to return to the Utopian fold of baianidade, in
extravagant praise of self and state.
The blocos afro of Bahia are positioned between competing
rhetorical models.  On the one hand, Afro-Brazilian material conditions
replicate those of other New World ex-slave societies, and Afro-Bahian
activists have found inspiration in these foreign cultural champions of
negritude, above all reggae artists.  On the other hand, looking from
the bottom up, baianidade effectively constitutes a dissident afro-
centrism within the New World fold because its discursive energies do
not pursue themes based on distance between blacks and whites
(enforced by whites, suffered by blacks and eventually rhetorically
contested and re-invented in afrocentric perspectives), but rather
downplay the history of oppression and racial distance and instead
engage Utopian notions of felicitous miscegenation.
The evolution of mainstream baianidade
From a conventional Western liberal academic perspective,
the difficult thing to grasp in Bahian cultural developments is that the
apparent political radicalism of discourse in songs and announcements
does not necessarily express everyday perceptions and strategies.
Aesthetic innovation is not filtered through the same obstacles as social
projects.  Differences of speed in different domains of advance (for
example aesthetic, moral and material), generate gaps between different
faces of progressive rhetoric.  Baianidade has traditionally been more
tolerant of aesthetic afrocentric liberation than in the U.S., but less
tolerant of militancy for material equity.  The moral status of blacks is
affected by both aesthetic and material indices and tends to oscillate
between them with a slippery ambiguity favorable to the maintenance
of the established order.  Aesthetic valorization implies moral legitimacy
and therefore ultimately cidadania; however, if the valorization is in
fact restricted to certain public and private spaces (carnaval, artistic
performance, the street, but not Church or bourgeois salon), it can
substitute real cidadania.
Further, despite the obvious susceptibility of baianidade to
logical deconstruction and exposure as a frame convenient to the
interests of the status quo, it is a formidably productive cultural model.
This is particularly important to black cultural expression as an organic
communitarian process because of the traditional insistence on
authenticity and the criterion of public acceptance.  Secondly, Bahian
artistic expression of negritude is highly responsive to commercial
valorization - blocos afro (Olodum and particularly Ara Ketu, though
not so much Ilê Ayê) have tended to move toward the ethno-aesthetic
middle ground of the axé music of the trios.  Thus, both from a local,
traditionalist, communitarian view and a globalizing, entrepreneurial,
individualist perspective, significant factors militate against
radicalization.
Instead of deconstructing the hypocrisies of baianidade, this
generative system must be acknowledged as the pertinent functional
model orienting blocos afro.  Traditional baianidade has undergone
globalization and mutated.  For the black population of the Recôncavo
globalization has meant exposure to the structural advances of
Westernization and to new international afrocentric rhetorical models.
These have been integrated by blocos afro, notably Olodum, which
simultaneously emphasizes its cutting edge modernity and its subaltern
communitarian pedigree.  Olodum insists on the right of its members
to ideological  and religious freedom of opinion.  While eminently
progressive, this tolerance is also consistent with baianidade and
problematic in terms of political mobilization.  The marrying of the motifs
of modernity and traditional community in Olodum, or the compatibility
within Ilê Ayê of aesthetic radicalism and political apathy, are also
instances of cohabitation of heterogeneous logics which may provoke
criticism or skepticism by progressive Western rationalists, but which
are characteristic of syncretism in baianidade.
The moral and material investigations in academic studies of
the current expansion of carnaval have, like the aesthetic attention of
tourists, been focused on blocos afro, virtually to the exclusion of the
mainstream blocos which quantitatively dominate the carnaval and
which tend ethnically to white, socio-economically to the middle class,
and aesthetically (in music style) to miscegenation, i.e. reproducing the
dominant paradigms of Bahian culture.  Despite the prevalence of
“bubble gum” lyrics in axé music,  closer examination of a notable trio
text in the light of the present theory of baianidade suggest a surprisingly
significant and complex semantic texture.
The most famous song of axé music, “O canto desta Cidade
sou eu” (“I am the song of this city”; Mercury 1992), while not a bloco
afro song, exemplifies the phenomenon of a narrative subject which is
postulated as representing the spirit of the moment and of the place, of
being the essence of carnaval.  The song begins:
A cor dessa cidade sou eu / O canto dessa cidade é meu /
O gueto, a rua, a fé, / Eu vou andando a pé, / Pela cidade
bonita, / O toque do afoxé / E a força, de onde vem? / Ninguém
explica / Ela é bonita (...)
I am the colour of this city / The song of this city is mine /
The ghetto, the street, faith / I get around on foot / Through the
beautiful city / Afoxé percussion / The power, where does it
come from? / No one can explain / It is beautiful (...)
The text acknowledges the significance and interplay of non-
white ethnicity and aesthetic proprietary (cor and canto);  with the
justification of intuition rather than explanation, it marries socio-ethnic
marginalization and domination of the public space of the street (gueto
and rua), and the beauty with religious righteousness (fé, bonita).  The
song also invokes Salvador’s afro roots (afoxé - percussive music derived
from candomblé and performed in carnaval by blocos de afoxé rather
than blocos afro) though the song is itself the epitome of trio music, i.e.,
completely secularized, harmonically westernized and heavily amplified
band music played by groups with no specific community affiliation.
The lyrical subject of the song is in fact the spirit of carnaval,
but because of the extensive use of the first person it was associated by
many listeners with the singer and author of the song, the reigning
diva of axé music, Daniela Mercury.  As a white singer performing Afro-
referent mestiço music  in a largely Black city, this apparent
appropriation of the spirit of carnaval by the media princess caused a
certain resentment.  Moral resentment against the implication of the
lyric was weaker than the aesthetic enthusiasm for the song, however.
The singer was not criticized by the blocos afro. She later collaborated
with the only bloco afro to practice ethnic exclusivism, Ilê Ayê, and
used their dancers in her shows.
The song illustrates a number of points framing the present
study:  black ethnic heritage as a creative resource and as point of
reference for authenticity; the harmonious resolution of difference
through integration, ritually marked by aesthetic deference to afro-
centrism; the interaction between blocos afro and trios, which, within
the carnaval world, constitute the communally sacred and the merely
hedonistic tangents of an event which is both ritual and recreational
opportunity.
The singer’s ambiguous colour adscription, between the
whiteness which presumably facilitated her professional ascension and
the righteous invocation of non-whiteness in the lyric, suggests a sort
of straddling of positions along the race axis: markers of ethno-cultural
praxis associated with one group are appropriable by another; blacks
can whiten with money, whites can appropriate black art and sell it
more easily than blacks.  This freedom erodes group exclusivity (and
therefore solidarity) and encourages the process of assimilation to the
cultural mainstream, even if after an initial phase of valorization of the
alternate ethnicity.  The song also suggests that classic afrocentric
rhetorical tropes can be appropriated by the white singer.  Along the
lines outlined earlier of the New World afrocentric totemization of taboo,
victim status (gueto) is reworked into a positive talisman of identity,
marking the community’s authenticity and its role as origin of artistic
inspiration.
The flexibility of the ethnicity axis has a parallel in the
oscillation between moral and aesthetic references.  The song moves
fluidly between and associates semantic units of either category.
Together, they coalesce to achieve an impressive and mysterious force
(força).  This association, and the creation of a sort of incarnation of the
abstract spirit of carnaval is consistent with syncretism.
Carnaval is not the maximal symbol of baianidade merely
because of the material circumstance of being the biggest single event
and the major tourist attraction.  The semantic logic of carnaval is
consistent with the cultural system of baianidade.  According to classical
theorizations, carnaval temporarily invokes the abolition of social
hierarchy, and substitutes this chronologically limited opening for real
abolition (and thus preserves the existing order).  This scenario is
consistent with classic baianidade.  One must also interpret the current
tendency to permanent carnavalization, i.e. regular indulgence of
carnaval enthusiasm and license in the celebration through the year of
an extraordinary number of festivities.  This seems to be a modernization
of carnaval as a consumer activity; no longer chronologically restricted,
it affords a constantly consumable good, which could be alternately
diagnosed as healthy recreation or as an opiate (given the extreme
poverty of many enthusiasts).  Ongoing exposure of very poor people to
spectacles of luxury and consumption in television programs and
advertisements is often postulated as a possible incentive to consumer
discontent and thus (non-ideological) civil disobedience.  In this sense
a permanent carnaval outlet may be useful from a demagogical point of
view.
At the same time the experience of carnaval, poised between
ritual and hedonism, and including the fundamental feature of the
expression of fantasy through disguise, also plays at the boundary
between the collective and the individual, whether the former is defined
in terms of a particular community or in the gross terms of racial identity.
Carnaval is an opportunity to be someone else, changing genders (cross-
dressing is common), ethnicity (whites parading as black pharaohs in a
bloco afro performance), historical moments (as in the classic Marie
Antoinette costume) and so on.  While theories of carnaval have focused
on the flattening of social hierarchy, the process is more complex in
that it involves the possibility of appropriation of a different identity,
and implies possible penetration between categories.40 This dissolving
of barriers between cultural categories is the base rule of the ideology
of miscegenation in baianidade (for example: a white can become a pai-
de-santo in candomblé). Carnaval is an act of travesty:  an aesthetic
overcoming of barriers marking difference, not by real abolition of the
differences but by a simulacre.  Its importance should not
underestimated given the major differences between societies which
do and do not indulge this ritual exercise.   Within the world of carnaval
there are also different logics.  While the mask carnaval of Venice, for
example, ritualizes and focuses exclusively on the plastic dimension of
substitution, the Dyonisian emphasis in Bahian (Brazilian) carnaval,
in going outside oneself, experiments psychologically with (the idea of)
abolition of barriers and denial of necessary difference between roles
and types - including genders, classes and races.  The catch, however,
is that the superlative aesthetic freedom exercised under baianidade
(and exemplified in the drastic formal evolutions of Bahian carnaval
including its re-Africanization) creates a chimera of conceptual freedom
in which other existential domains are similarly mutatable.  Thus,
carnaval discourse rhetorically invokes notions of societal change which
are presented as immanent or necessary though they are merely
speculations, and subsequently substitutable by other figures with
which they may be logically inconsistent.  This exercise of imaginative
inspiration over political aspiration is not offensive to the sensibility of
baianidade though it can be frustrating for academics attempting to
elucidate a consistent social philosophy.
The vitality of baianidade is also manifest in its adaptability
to globalization as Westernization.  The industrial marketing of both
folklore and dynamic contemporary afrocentric for tourism, as well as
the modernization of afrocentric organizations implicitly negotiates
between a series of alternate values and processes inscribable within
Westernization and re-Africanization as opposing paradigms.  Against
afro-centrism, Western modernization is eurocentric or non-ethnic; the
ideology of new afro-centrism attempts to utilize modernization as
conscientização of the individual in opposition to the commodification
of culture, and thus moves towards political mobilization as opposed to
consumerism;  afrocentric carnaval organizations stress the ritual
representative and moral aspects of their identity, whereas common
blocos compete virtually exclusively on the basis of ludic enjoyment;
the rhetorical link between subalterity and negritude militates in favor
of adscription to a community as opposed to the focus in Western society
on individual differentiation and fulfillment.  In general, afro-centrism
infers a political cidadania and rights of moral identity, while
Westernization promises economic cidadania and rights as a consumer
to a materially desirable lifestyle.  Blocos afro consciously balance
afrocentric ideological commitment with the determination to prosper
materially such that a significant part of their official rhetoric consists
of insistence on their administrative prowess.  On the other hand, non
afro artists such as Daniela Mercury freely appropriate afro styles and
afrocentric rhetorical tropes wherever this is perceived to give a
commercial edge (and in some cases also because of genuine ideological
solidarity).
Separate to the passive imitation of external, world-wide
systematic changes which naturally play a major role in all Brazilian
developments, traditional baianidade has characteristics as a cultural
system which are compatible with postmodern society.  The logic of
syncretism, not only as a religious phenomenon but rather as a cultural
practice leads to a sophistication of what might be called subject position
jumping.  Traditional societies classically restrict individuals to specific
locations (as determined by professional role and social prestige for
example);  postmodern capitalism, through the development of the
consumer as the ultimate mode of social engagement, maximizes the
desire for individual differentiation (articulated by the market in an
ever increasing diversification of product) and also constantly reduces
barriers between consumer and product.  Given that the ultimate
consumer vehicle is personal identity (the individual expresses identity
through choices about consumption), access to identity positions is
imperative (expressed in the acquisition or consumption of goods and
services associated with those roles).  The underlying market logic of
profit notwithstanding, the characteristic experience of the postmodern
subject involves a series of identity engagements. There is an accelerated
rate of changes in personal identity adscription even in the ideological
domain, for example religious affiliation (the young person who first
abandons the family’s religion for another, and then another).  Though
the process is completely different in its historical etymology, syncretism
in baianidade, in its facilitation of simultaneous pluralism (within the
society or within the individual) effects a parallel multiplicity of options
and deferral of exclusive adscription.
Secondly, the ideology of miscegenation, extrapolated in the
credo of racial democracy and implicitly invoked by individuals who
exercise the subjective options in Brazilian racial identification, works
against group solidarity and in favor of individual differentiation.  Again,
though the historical etymology is again different to that of capitalism,
the consequence is that consistent with late capitalism, the culture of
race relations in Brazil problematizes ethnicity as an exclusive
identification by the individual and propels him/her toward the
engagement of strategies of personal as opposed to community
improvement.
Conclusions
Afro-centrism in Bahia as expressed in blocos afro powerfully
advocates an ideological agenda comprehending moral dignity for blacks,
and successfully disseminates an aesthetic complex of representations
and performances as the complement to its communitarian agenda.
However, there is little evidence of a solid relation between moral ideas
and societal change beyond the domain of self-esteem.  The afrocentric
rhetoric of blocos afro may even be structurally dysfunctional in its
ostensible call for cidadania, both in that it is predicated on an organic
link between negritude and subalterity, and in that, to the extent that
it is consistent with the broader social logic of carnaval, it actually serves
as an opiate in the Marxist sense.
Afro-centrism as a moral discourse and aesthetic system has
proved a powerful rhetorical model, emerging as the predominant code
of cultural identification for ethno-social subaltern elements, including
non-blacks.  Afrocentric models are growing as a code of aesthetic
fulfillment for the individual (generally but not always black).  Finally
afro-centrism is highly successful as a cultural commodity for the export
of carnaval and the attraction of tourism dollars.  There is also
considerable ideological support from Europe for afrocentric
communitarian projects, so that afro-centrism is also an ideological
commodity exportable beyond the obvious ethnic domain of the black
population.
Despite its political consonance with racial democracy,
baianidade must be considered as something much more complex than
a deliberate mechanism of alienation of black ethnicity, manipulated
by the Euro-Bahian oligarchy in order to sustain its dominance over
Bahian blacks.  Rather, baianidade is an ideology of miscegenation,
which, in its celebration of the African legacy, constitutes an aberrant
afro-centrism within the range of New World afrocentric discourses.
The unique aspects of baianidade as afrocentric discourse include its
openness to non-whites, its syncretic capacity for simultaneous
subscription to heterogeneous and contradictory discourses, and its
structural valorization of subjective individual strategies over group
solidarity.  Through these same qualities, baianidade is well-suited for
adaptation to and creative assimilation of the changes effected through
globalization as Westernization, but structurally incompatible with
globalization as afrocentric conscientização.
The disinterest in insistence on historical racial differentiation
(exemplified here in relation to Rastafari, and also characteristic of the
North American Nation of Islam) induces beatific rhetorical genres in
traditional baianidade which are based not on the classic New World
“positive negative” model (redemption through resistance, overcoming
oppression and emerging as morally victorious).  New baianidade under
the sign of afro-centrism as in the songs of the blocos afro does engage
foreign afrocentric rhetorical tropes, and there is great admiration for
the diverse New World heroes of negritude (Bob Marley, Malcolm X,
Martin Luther King etc.).  However this should be interpreted as fraternal
solidarity rather than real ideological adscription to any particular
external discourse.
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